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welfare, and this extends even to the
moral authority of the military to enforce its regulations regarding administration of such agents as Anthrax vaccine
to military forces, or to new but not yet
fully recognized scientific discoveries.
Equally provocative is the thesis that
medical contributions to interrogational
torture may be morally defensible under
conditions that offer the possibility of
preventing egregious harm to others.
As a treatise addressing contemporary
ethical issues in military medicine, this
is a useful contribution. Unfortunately,
the writer’s style at times intermixes elements of the arcane phraseology of the
professional academic ethics community. “The uninitiated” must read and
reread some passages if they are motivated to comprehend fully the ethical
dilemmas being debated and dissected.
ARTHUR M. SMITH, MD

Captain, Medical Corps
U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)

Vego, Milan. The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied
and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
479pp. $55

There have been many books published
about the battle for Leyte Gulf. This
book, however, is unique, because it is
not only a narrative but also a critical
analysis of the planning, preparation,
and execution of that famous battle as
viewed by both the Americans and the
Japanese. Milan Vego, professor of military operations at the Naval War College and author of a textbook on
operational warfare, is also a former
merchant marine officer. He has tackled the subject of this work with much
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vigor and depicts the battle with clarity
and in great depth.
The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapters 1 through 5 show how
both sides planned and organized for
the battle, and chapter 6 discusses the
background and operations just before
the engagement. However, the heart
and soul of the book are in the final section that depicts the battle itself.
Vego begins by noting that in the early
days of the Pacific War the Americans
split their command arrangements,
with General Douglas MacArthur in
charge of the South West Pacific Area
(SWPA) and Admiral Chester Nimitz
commanding the Pacific Ocean Area
(POA). This scheme worked well
enough until the Leyte operation, when
it produced much confusion over command relationships, leading to problems between Fleet Admiral William F.
Halsey and Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, Commander Allied Naval
Forces that almost lost them the battle.
Vego is critical of the delays in communications between various American
components. He concludes that the
Americans relied too much on Japanese
intentions—as interpreted via information gleaned from the MAGIC intercepts
—and less on actual capability. He believes that the Americans’ strength was
in their operational-logistic plans and
programs.
However, Vego argues, the Japanese
were even worse in comparable ways.
Parochial competition between the
army and navy cost them dearly. The
Japanese had little intelligence that
could compare with that of the Americans, and they had serious logistical
problems that were never properly
resolved.
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Among the book’s strengths are the
subheadings of each chapter, which allow the reader to skip around. Vego’s
sixty-seven pages of notes are excellent,
enabling the reader to delve deeper into
the battle, and his bibliography is outstanding. There are sixteen appendixes
showing the order of battle of the adversaries, as well as six excellent maps.
Vego’s conclusion, while offering nothing new, does an outstanding job of
summarizing the battle. Also, his summary of Halsey’s failure in the battle is
superior. Professor Vego concludes that
“the Japanese came close to accomplishing their mission not because of
their skills but because of the mistakes
that Halsey made.”
DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN

University of Pittsburgh

Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History
of the Crusades. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2006. 1,024pp. $35

Christopher Tyerman, a lecturer in medieval history at Oxford University, offers this work at a crucial moment. With
world attention focused as it is on the
Middle East and on the social, political,
religious, and military interactions between the Muslim East and Christian
West, God’s War could not have come at
a more opportune time, especially for
those who wish to have a better understanding of this exotic and violent period. Over the past decade, the subject of
the Crusades has become a popular one
for writers, but Steven Runciman’s
three-volume History of the Crusades remains the primary standard of comparison. Tyerman accurately, if perhaps with
a bit of hubris, notes that Runciman’s
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work is now outdated and seriously
flawed. What makes Tyerman’s work
stand out is the extent of his knowledge
of the entire crusading era and his ability to deploy that knowledge in a clear,
concise, and generally readable manner
in the course of a single (if massive)
volume.
God’s War is reasonably if not totally
comprehensive. The first four Crusades
are covered in minute detail, the later
Crusades less so. Tyerman, however,
also discusses many related movements
not normally considered as crusades,
such as the Reconquista in Spain and
Teutonic campaigns in the Baltic, and
even the expansion of the concept of
holy war to the conquest of the New
World. This breadth of coverage makes
up for an occasional lack of depth. At
times the book does suffer from an
overreliance on name-dropping, some
of which is repetitive and, for the novice, confusing.
Tyerman stresses that one cannot know
how the Crusaders thought or felt—
making it ironic when he comments, as
he frequently does, on what did or did
not motivate them. This is peculiar, as
one of the strongest points of the book is
its explanation of how the movement
originated and the ways in which the
Crusades were products of the sometimes
paradoxical social, religious, and political
forces of the Middle Ages. Another strong
point is his descriptions of the personalities of the Crusaders. Tyerman fleshes out
the leaders, men like the Christians
Godfrey of Bullion and Bohemond,
Frederick Barbarossa, or Richard of
Anjou, and the Muslim leaders Saladin
and Baybars. These people are described
from the standpoint both of their apologists and their critics and enemies,
and thus as true three-dimensional
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